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Ireland was Germany’s off-shore tart — A look back in Time


AN ARTICLE WELL WORTH A READ

by Golem XIV on JANUARY 24, 2011 in LATEST

Now that Mr Cowen has lost control of his party, coalition and country, the Irish can expect to be bullied and hectored from all sides. It is more important than ever for Ireland to defend herself against the claims that she owes the rest of us. She doesn’t.

Every European bank exposed to Irish loans, every bond holder holding Irish debt – both bank and sovereign, and every foreign central bank concerned for the solvency of its own banks will start to crank up a barrage of propaganda and threats.  It will be top of everyone’s propaganda agenda to make sure the Irish election offers no choices that could destabilize the unexploded ordinance of European bank insolvency.

The European financial class will be desperate to ensure that the Irish have an election that is carefully constrained so as not to offer anything that might actually help them. As far as the banks, the ECB and all the leaders of nations whose banks would suffer losses if Ireland were to default or restructure, the Irish people are NOT to be exposed to ideas of default.

All parties must be told,  and if that fails to convince, made to feel directly via the bond market, the consequences of any alteration of the course followed so far. And, of course, it has already started. Here   is what senior ECB banker, Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, said on January 15th regarding Ireland’s electoral choices.

“It would be dramatic for Ireland if just by changing government you renege on the promises that Ireland as a sovereign has made.”

Not that he would dream of making veiled threats to try to frighten Irish public opinion into choosing what would be best for the banks over what would be best for the Irish people.

“Look at those countries which defaulted, like Argentina, Pakistan, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire. Do the Irish people want to go through the same experience?”

No mention of Iceland there. Funny that.

The foreign press will run story after story about the dangers of ‘contagion’, of the need for responsibility and resolve.  The Irish Central bank will step in to make grave pronouncements if the political parties seem not to be holding the line.

Foreign leaders such as , Merkel, Olli Rehn, Barosso, Trichet and our British clowns, all with their own national interest, will give talks and be quoted in their papers about the need for steady fiscal responsibility and the unthinkable consequences of any waivering.

If there is any rumbling of popular discontent, then scape goats will be found – people upon whom some anger can be harmlessly vented.  But if that does not work then the rhetoric will get more pointed. Ireland will be reminded that ‘it’s their fault’ and they ‘have no one to blame but themselves’.  In the German press any hint that Ireland may be thinking of restructuring will be met with dark reminders of how ‘Ireland’ in the form of Depfa had to be bailed out by Germany.

In short I don’t think the Financial class is pleased that the politically unreliable (when it comes to European questions) Irish are going to have an election at this delicate time.  I think the run up to the elections will involve a lot of propaganda designed to shout down any opposition to bail outs and debt payments.

So I thought this might be a good moment to get a few things on record regarding Depfa, HRE (Hypo Real Estate) and the banking crisis blame-game.

For those who aren’t already familiar with the Depfa and HRE story, here it is in a very small nut shell.  Hypo Real Estate was the huge German bank which we were all suddenly told, back in 2008, had to be bailed out by the German State at vast cost. But, they said, they had no choice, because Hypo (HRE) was so large and its debts so huge that if it collapsed it would, at the very least, bring down German banking.  It was Europe’s AIG – to big to be allowed to fail. Then the back story emerged.  HRE had bought ‘Irish’ bank Depfa at the top of the market at almost the same time as RBS bought ABN Ambro.  Both purchases were insane and both killed the purchasing bank.

It was then put about that the collapse of HRE was in fact due to a huge funding crisis at Depfa always referred to as ‘its Irish subsidiary’.  From that came the notion that Depfa must have hidden its true state from HRE. Why else would HRE have bought a bank which couldn’t fund itself?

And that is how the story firmed up.  Irish Depfa must have lied about its true state in an effort to sell itself to Hypo, so that when Depfa’s hidden financial problems surfaced, the cost of them killed Hypo and then fell upon the German rather than the Irish tax payer.

It is sometimes easy to forget with all the sordid and ruinous business of Anglo Irish, that the beginning of the whole crisis in Ireland and in Europe was intimately tied to Depfa and HRE. Thus I think it is worth reminding ourselves of some of the misinformation and perhaps offering a few less well known facts. Facts which might help the Irish defend themselves.

It was often said, particularly in the German press, that Depfa ‘brought down HRE’. Had HRE not bought Depfa when it did in 2007, then it would have been the Irish, who had incubated the problem, who would have had to pay for it, not the Germans. There is always this undertone that somehow Depfa must have lied to or misled HRE.

Was DEPFA really an Irish Bank which the Irish should have bailed out?

Less than 1% of Depfa’s business was Irish. Virtually no Irish Banking money flowed into Depfa or its deals.  Depfa was not a major employer in Ireland. A couple of hundred jobs at most.  Few of its senior positions were held by Irish people. Thus in purely bloodless financial terms there was virtually no reason for Ireland to bail out Depfa. Depfa was not systemically important to Ireland or the rest of its banking sector. Depfa was, however, vital to the continued health of the German banking sector.  Add to this that the size of any bail out of Depfa was quite beyond what Ireland as a nation could have done. Ireland’s total IMF bailout stands at €85 billion. All on its own the HRE/Depfa bail out has already cost Merkel well over €100billion. Depfa, like one or two other banks in Ireland, was simply too big for its host. It was a financial cuckoo in the nest.

The German’s, however, would have bailed out Depfa even if it had not been bought by HRE because Depfa’s failure would have crippled something essential to the entire German banking sector – the Pfandbrief business.  The Pfandbrief is a German ‘covered bond’.  A covered bond is simply a super safe kind of bond. It is considered as safe as Sovereign bonds but gives a higher return. Germany invented the Pfandbrief and its banks relied on it.

The Pfandbrief/covered bond is considered super safe because, unlike other bonds, the Pfandbrief is backed by a ring-fenced set of assets which cover the total value of the Pfandbrief/bond. So even if the bank issuing the Pfandbrief were to go under, the Pfandbriefs themselves would never default.  And it has been the bed-rock of the Pfandbrief’s reputation that in 250 years no Pfandbrief has ever defaulted.

At the time of the Depfa bail out there were €806 Billion in Pfandbrief outstanding. The third largest chunk of the German bond market and the section that had been growing rapidly and which everyone wanted to be a part of. The German banking sector wanted to grow and compete with the British and the Americans on the international stage. They saw the Pfandbrief as an important part of their strategy. This article from 1999 gives a great feel for how the markets were then, as they stood on the cusp bubble years.

If Depfa had gone down, it would have taken the AAA rated dependability of the Pfandbrief with it.  Ireland could let that happen, Germany could not. That is why, I think, Germany would have bailed out Depfa no matter who owned it.

Why did Depfa move to Ireland if it was still a ‘German’ bank?

Depfa was always a German bank, that had simply chosen to locate itself in Ireland for funding and regulatory reasons. Does this mean that Ireland was stealing Germany’s banking sector?  No.  The best way to think of Ireland is as German’s off-shore tax haven banking centre with one significant feature – it was within the Euro zone.  Every country has one.  The UK has many. Germany needed one and Ireland was happy to oblige.  Thus it suited Germany as much as it did Ireland. It was a partnership.

Of course Ireland made itself everyone’s honey. But I think it is fair to say that of her many customers she had a special relationship with Germany. Think about it. Depfa, HRE and HVB (Now UniCredit), Deutsche Bank, LBBW, DZ bank, Commerzbank, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, Landesbank Sachsen, WestLB all gravitated to Dublin.

The fact that this arrangement/partnership has fallen apart in acrimony doesn’t alter the fact that when the money was flowing the Germany banks, German bankers and all their politicians were every happy with what was going on in their Irish subsidiary. Ireland does not owe Germany an apology.

In fact I think Ireland should be asking Germany some hard questions over the sometimes abusive relationship German banks have had, and some still have, with Ireland.  See here for how WestLB after it collapsed created an SPV called Phoenix, as a means for parking/dumping €23 billion of toxic ‘assets’ in Ireland.   This, it seems to me, is the Toxic Debt Wasteland I wrote about, becoming real.

How did the Irish Funding work?

Depfa had always raised its cash through its own Pfandbrief bank. It’s source of funding were the Landesbanks who in turn got the cash from the bottom of Germany’s banking system the Kasse, deposit banks.  They had all the cash.

But there were limiting factors. German money was the spur to Depfa’s early growth but the bank, according to a former board member I have spoken to, wanted more.  They wanted better access to international funding and international customers. Neither, as more than one German banker has told me, was readily available in Germany.

Ireland made itself a meeting place for those with money in need of investing and those looking for loans.  For Depfa in particular it was an attractive place. Depfa had decided to target Russian and East European public investments (investing in publicly funded works) and Ireland had made itself attractive to Russian and Eastern money. Money in various shades of shadiness flowed to Ireland.  The timeline of German banks and for that matter all European banks (thinking of UniCredit here) going to Ireland runs parallel to East European and later Russian money beginning to flood out of the former soviet states looking for a new home in the West.  Ireland met that need.  Ireland become THE favourite investment destination for Russian money.

Money was placed in the East. There were and are plenty of subsidiaries there who could pass it along to be funneled westward through Austria (Bank Austria) or Cyprus onward to Ireland where it could find its way to the heart of European banking in Ireland.

Depfa set up a brand new bank Depfa ACS bank, specifically to tap into all this new money.  It even got the Irish parliament, in agreement with the European authorities and German banking sector, to write a new law making it possible.  Ireland created its own version of the Pfandbrief – the Asset Backed Security. This allowed lots of new money to join with the steady flow of Germany money from the Landesbanks to unite in Ireland to the benefit of Ireland AND Germany.

Of course Europe has access to all sorts of Off Shore Banking so what made Ireland special? Ireland was physically close, was already a corporate centre, was English speaking (good for the Americans), was low tax, used English Law (good for London) and had the same ‘we can do if for you’ attitude of Luxembourg.  What gave Ireland the edge over Luxembourg was it offered faster turn arounds on setting up deals and far more lax regulation.  Ireland was perfect.

Ireland and Luxembourg are banking competitors.  But Luxembourg is not English speaking, is slower and worst of all has a regulator who occasionally regulates. The Luxembourg regulator has all his own teeth. Ireland’s had his removed along with his balls a long time ago.

As long ago as 2005, Charlie McCreevy, Ireland’s former Minister of Finance, (another Fianna Fáil man who was at the Ministry of Finance before Brian Cowen took over that job and showed everyone how it should really be done!)  who then became European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services (nothing like failing at one job  in order to get a better job…) addressed an esteemed EU/UN gathering in New York in 2005 in which he famously stated

“As Finance Minister in Ireland I saw what great entrepreneurial energies that a “light touch” regulatory system can unleash. 25 years ago we were the sick man of Europe. Today we are among the richest countries in Europe. Ireland is indeed testimony to the fact that you don’t need to be rich in natural resources to generate real wealth.”

That was shortly before someone shouted ICEBERG!

For those of you whose German is better than mine you will enjoy this German television (ZDF) expose of German Banking in Ireland and Depfa/HRE in particular*.  Apart for revealing interviews with senior people in the German banking world, it also contains a brief interview with David McWilliams who famously referred to the fact that the German bankers behaved in Ireland “like men in a brothel” – with the blind eye of the Irish Financial Regulator seeing no evil. WhistleblowerIRL’s roller coaster experience as UniCredit Ireland’s risk manager  illustrates the extent of the Irish regulator’s incompetence and/or criminality, and refusal to actually enforce regulations.

You can find more on Ireland’s regulatory cess pit and WhistleblowerIRL’s story in  Why Bank Regulation is a Joke, and Who Bankrupted Ireland.  For more the details of WhistleblowerIRL’s very much ongoing story see his blog here.

Of course if you want no regulation why not just go to the Caribbean?  The answer comes back to the German banks again.

Much of the money flowing into Europe looking to be invested would end up in Special Purpose Entities/Vehicles (SPE, SPV) or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). These are the legal containers which house and run the securities in a Collateralized Debt Obligation.  You securitize debts, you  put them in a CDO you  house the CDO in an SPE/V or SIV and you need somewhere to set up and domicile the SPE/SIV.  What Germany wanted was to have the dubious advantages of off shore combined with the above board respectability of Europe. German investors, the Landesbanks, wanted their money inside the OECD cordon of respectability while getting all the perks of off-shore. Ireland provided both.

A former, very senior banker from Depfa told me the Landesbanks could not buy Depfa’s debt/Asset Backed Securities fast enough.  Any issue Depfa made would be pre-sold to and wolfed down by the landesbanks before the ink was dry.  This was a partnership.

Now before I wrap this first part up, I would just like to note that,

Another banker, based in Germany, has recently pointed out to me that in all of the discussion about the Greek-Ireland-Spain/Portugal bailouts, the debate over the tax-payers’ money that was, and still is, being poured into the now-nationalised HRE/Depfa has mysteriously been silenced. I wonder why? The banker referred me to this documentary which raises some interesting questions about why and how HRE was bailed-out. It makes the importatnt link to Akerman at Deutsche Bank and how he appears to have told, not advised, but told, Merkel what to do. Merkel might be more of a tin wind-up model of an Iron lady rather than the real thing.

As I have very basic German-language skills, I would welcome any comments readers might have about these documentaries. This would help me to learn more about the HRE/Depfa saga.

On that note I am going to break the story here to stop this becoming too large.  I will continue in the next part with the question:

So what went wrong?  And why did HRE buy Depfa when it was already going wrong?

In which we will meet once again our old adversaries AIG and Goldman Sachs.

* I think no longer available

Part Two Tomorrow

via Ireland was Germany’s off-shore tart » Golem XIV – Thoughts.

What bankers don’t know


Obama-Democrats-Bank-Patrol-SC

What I am concerned with, is what hard working bankers really didn’t know, when with hindsight, we can see it was astounding that they didn’t know. Because that points the finger at the whole system. To gaol a few of the more flagrantly repulsive bankers, while invigorating, leaves the system untouched. It allows the guilty-but-uncaught to heave a sigh of relief and be able to talk of ‘a few bad apples’ and ‘lessons learned’ and ‘by the way, where’s my bonus?’

I want to look at the  truely breath-taking extent of what bankers really didn’t know and show that the banking system itself ,was and still is so genetically malformed that not only is it a breeding ground for the cancerously corrupt, the vicious, the venal and  the morally stunted, but that the system itself, in its entirity, would have collapsed even without them. The problem is not the corruption of a good system but the flourishing of a thoroughly bad one.

The Stupidity that was.

Let’s start with some of the most astonishingly stupid things that were done in the early days of the bank crisis:

2007 (October) Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) bought a very large part of Dutch banking giant, ABN Ambro for an eye-watering £49 billion.

2007 (October) German bank HypoReal Estate bought another German Bank Depfa for €2 billion ABOVE what even Depfa itself thought  it was worth (personal communication from a former Depfa director).

2008 (July) Bank of America (BoA) bought CountryWide Financial.

2008 (Sept) Bank of America (BoA) bought Merrill Lynch

2009 (May) Commerzbank bought Dresdner Bank.

There are many others of course, but these are the recent ones, which were clearly commercial decisions and not, like the 2009 Lloyds Bank purchse of  HBOS (Halifax/Bank of Scotland) or the ‘rescue’ of Bear Sterns, a government backed TBTF operation.

Each and everyone of these deals ended in bankruptcy and a vast public bail-out. How could they have been so stupid? Let’s ask them.

Here is an email (taken from p. 197 of the Consolidated Class Action filed in NY District Court against Citi) sent on 3rd March 2007 from a senior Bear Stearns Fund Manager Ralph Cioffi to his fellow Fund Manager Matt Tannin.

“…the worry for me is that subprime losses will be far worse than anything people have modeled”

Yet four days later on the 7th March Mr Cioffi wrote to another colleague,

Matt [Tannin – Cioffi’s fellow Fund Manager at Bear Stearns] said it’s either a meltdown or the greatest buying opportunity ever.

And there you have it. In 2007 Matt Tannin, senior Hedge Fund Manager at one of Wall Street’s oldest banks, Bear Stearns, didn’t know if it was going to be a meltdown or the greatest buying opportunity ever. And this is despite the fact that Tannin and Cioffi and everyone on Wall Street, had already had a couple of years worth of clear evidence that asset values were collapsing and the securities based on those valuations were becoming unsellable. Don’t take my word for it, you can read page after page of first hand testimony from the dealers and senior executives themselves, in every section of the financial industry, in the Class Action linked above.

Thus this isn’t the corruption of a good system by a few crooks. This is clever, though probably morally stunted people, hard at work in an utterly dysfunctional and destructive system. The same system we still have. No matter what evidence was piling up the priests of global finance just could not believe it was all a disaster or that there was anything fundamentally wrong with what they were doing or the system in which they were doing it. They just could not see that it could be anything more serious than a massive market ‘correction’ in which case there would be equally massive rewards for those greedy enough to take the gamble. As late as 2009 RBS, BoA, Commerzbank and Hypo Real Estate all still thought it was the perfect moment to borrow tens of billions in order to buy hundreds of billions worth of another banks’ loans, assets and libilities.

But back to Mr Cioffi who has more to teach us. By 23rd March 2007 Mr Cioffi had come to a personal conclusion and started to move his own money ($2 million) OUT of the funds he was managing. By 19th April, Bear Stearns had commissioned and received a report on its CDO Sub-Prime holdings.  Matt Tannin emailed Ralph Cioffi and said,

…the subprime market looks pretty damn ugly… If we believe the [CDOs report is] ANYWHERE CLOSE to accurate I think we should close the funds now.  (My emphasis)

But he and Mr Tannin did not close those funds nor advise investors to get their money out. To the contrary, in a conference  call to the fund’s clients Mr Cioffi said,

”there’s no basis for thinking this is one big disaster,”

Sadly it was for the investors who listened to him. Those people stayed in until the funds imploded as did the entire bank shortly after. Matt and Ralph were charged with fraud by the SEC and taken to Federal Court. Where they were aquitted.

Why were they aquitted? Were the jurers knobbled? I don’t think so. One of the jurors Serphaine Stimpson, said afterwards,

“They were scapegoats for Wall Street.”

I think Ms Stimpson was correct. Cioffi and Tannin were revolting creatures who protected themselves from a looming disaster but ‘honestly’ (On Wall Street it’s a relative term)  couldn’t bring themselves to believe that the entire Wall Street, global financial edifice was a suppurating pustule. They also knew full well that if they advised clients to get out and closed their funds it would reveal the truth and that in turn would unleash panic. So they didn’t.

They no doubt felt that while there would be a disaster for some, there would still be money to be made for a few of the, luckier or ‘smarter’, ones. I suspect they would still count themselves as among the ‘smarter’ and acted accordingly.

What’s more, no matter how massive the losses that would be inflicted, I suspect our loathsome twosome also thought there had to be someone who had to take the risks and suffer the losses, in order that the system itself be preserved to profit another day. Only they wanted to make sure that that ‘someone’ was not them personally. On this, the rest of the Global Financial class agreed with them. Today, five years in to the cataclysm, it is clear that that ‘someone’ was only ever going to be you and me. Someone had to be frogmarched up to ‘save’ the system but it was never going to be the wealthy. Those senior bond holders are oh so sacrosanct. Whereas depositors, well they can be bailed in can’t they.

I have dredged Mr Cioffi and Mr Tannin back into the light not simply to pour more scorn on them but to make it clear they were not unusual. They were not guilty of anything that the whole of the global financial system was not guilty of. The larger point about them is not their personal repulsiveness but their averageness. They were two Mr Normals in the workings of the financial and banking system. They did nothing ‘wrong’, nor even unusual. They were not rogue traders. What was wrong is the normal working of the system.

The wider picture.

Let’s go back to that roll call of takeovers. What we need to keep firmly in mind is that these takeovers were done by people who were earning millions and who insisted they were so clever, so ‘smart’ they were worth every penny and cent. They did what they did at their own pace with no constraints or outside pressures.

What this means in practice is that all the buyers, RBS, Hypo. BoA and Commerzbank had full and unfettered access to all the information they needed to understand fully what they were going to buy. For example when Hypo bought Depfa I know from a someone who was at board level at the time, that a special room was created which contained all the information DEPFA had. The books were open for scrutiny. Hypo executives had full and unfettered access. There were experts on hand to answer any question. I wrote about it in the second part of ‘Ireland was Germany’s Off-shore Tart.’

And yet, they paid €2 billion over the odds and it led very quickly to the absolutely titanic collapse of both and a bail out of Hypo to the tune of something in the region of €180B.

I have talked of Depfa because I have been told what happened by someone who was involved. But the same, or something very similar,  would have happened in all the takeovers. It is required by law. It is Due Diligence. You cannot spend share holders money without being able to tell them you know what it is you are buying. Thus we know that Commerzbank executives looked at the opened books of Dresdner. That RBS experts looked closely at ABM Ambro’s assets and loans and came to the highly paid view that this was worth spending £49 billion on, and that BoA top brass pored over the inner most secrets of Merrrill Lynch and CountryWide. To suggest anything less would be to accuse them of dereliction of their duty, of something very near to fraud, and that would be libelous would it not?  And yet each and every one of these deals ended in disaster on a global scale.

So where does this leave us? To my mind there are only two possible scenarios. Either DEPFA, ABN Ambro, Merrill, Dresdner and Countrwide executives all lied and concealed and thus all the information Hypo and the other buyers were seeing was a pack of lies, in which case the Hypo et al bankers did their jobs but were misled by crooks. Or, Depfa and the other sellers did faithfully lay bare the truth but the buyer bankers were either too stupid to see or did not care. You tell me is there a third, happier scenario I am missing? I know many banks log on and read this blog so one of you write in and tell us what the third, missing scenario is. Write to me confidentially. I really would like to know if I am missing the obvious.

But before anyone suggests that everything was honestly revealed by the sellers and all competently understood by the buyers, but that both were foxed by unforseen events which so changed cirumstances that a few deals did go bad – before you try to tell us anything like that – please refer back to the Tannin and Cioffi emails above and in fact to the rest of the evidence in the Citi indictment. Events were certainly NOT unforeseen. And please also remember that it wasn’t just a few deals that went bad, it was in many cases 100% of whole groups of securities and thousands of deals which went bad and turned out not to be anything at all like they were supposed to be -as the paperwork claimed they were. Citi lied. It’s there in the indictment. So did Merrill. So did all of them.

So am I saying it was all the sellers fault? No I am not. We cannot know that for sure in every case. We only know it for sure in some cases. In the rest we don’t know who was more to blame buyers or sellers. But it doesn’t matter does it? That is the point. Stand back and what do we have? Either we have banks full of bankers who are corrupt liars or we have banks full of the slow witted and guillible who do not understand the financial deals it is their job to understand…or both. Either way we are left with an industry that  did not and – unless everything has magically improved – cannot and will not do its job. We have a financial system which in very important ways, critical ways, is staffed and run by people who, whether by criminal and moral  degeneracy or simple stupidity, are not fit for their jobs.

It seems a terribly sweeping statement I know. But run back over how we got here and tell me where we, I, went wrong.  Unless you can find the place we lost the thread, then what else can we conclude other than that we have a banking system which is not fit for purpose? Or perhaps I should say, is not fit for the purpose we were expecting. It does leave the possible conclusion that our bankers and regulators are all very fit for purpose it ‘s just a rather different purpose from the one we expected.

What one banker didn’t know.

Before I conclude, I want to return from the general to the specific. Let us hear from another insider, this time the Chief Risk Officer of Bank of America during the time it was buying Merrill and CountryWide. Please welcome Amy Woods Brinkley. She was once considered one of the 25 most powerful women in banking (according to US Banker magazine).

BoA bought CountryWide in July 2008 and Merrill Lynch in Spetember 2008. In Late September 2008 just as the ink of both deals was about dry, Amy Woods Brinkly gave an extensive interview to Forbes Magazine. In it she was asked why BoA bought Countrywide.  She replied,

Our company did very extensive due diligence. I’ve been involved in a lot of our acquisitions and I don’t recall one that was more thorough. During that process I became increasingly comfortable; the problems at Countrywide were real, but they were also manageable.

Forbes pressed the point asking surely she was worried about the estimates of the write downs on Countrywide assets which were already being talked about as being between $8 -$30 billion. I should also mention that in March 2008, five months before BoA bought it, The FBI announced it was investigating CountryWide for fraud on mortgages and home loans. It didn’t stop BoA going ahead and buying, but presumably it did make them even more diligent.  Ms Brinkley’s reply –

As we said a number of times, we did very extensive due diligence on the transaction, not only before signing but going back in before closing the transaction, and we believe the economics made sense and the market-share opportunity is worth the risk…So again, just before closing the transaction we revisited the economics and we are comfortable with what they tell us.

Brinkley was rated by her peers as one of the best. Was she lied to? Were the lies so clever, so convoluted that she just missed them – all the many thousands of them? Or was she actually quite a stupid person seen as a genius by other fairly thick people? Or were they all, collectively, so cock-sure of themselves and the system which had made them rich and powerful, that none of them could see clearly any more? I think it is this last explanation which rings true. I am sure lies were told. We know from court documents and extensive anaysis of thousands of deals which were done and sold in the bubble years, that there was systemic fraud. What we don’t know is if everyone could see it was fraud or if they all had become captured by an ideology which said fraud is just ‘good’ business.

It’s worth bearing in mind that however senior and clever Ms Brinkley was, she was not the only one who was responsible for vetting the deal and doing the due diligence. Every deal has ranks of lawyers and experts who are handsomely paid to pour over the details and make sure the deal is sound. In the case of BoA and CountryWide the Washington DC law firm K&L Gates advised. Just as in the Depfa/Hypo case Goldmand advised.

However, it was Ms Brinkley who was thrown under the bus. She lost her job. She was replaced by Mr Greg Curl who had been the senior deal maker for the  Merrill deal. The Merrill deal has cost BoA $30B and counting. He too has now left the bank though he’s still in finance.

Today.

Is this all history? No it’s not. Most of the people who lied and/or “didn’t know” back then are still in the financial system, still lying to us, the regulators or themselves. Just this week one of the only really ethical banks in the UK the Co-operative Bank has had to come clean about the scale of losses it inherited when it bought the Britiannia Building society (at the time the second largest in the UK) …in April 2009.

I may be biased, I bank with the Co-operative, but I don’t think they are a fraudulent organization. I think they really do operate more ethically than most. Possibly running second, among UK banks, only to Triodos bank. But the fact is the Cooperative bought Britannia at the height of the crisis after doing its due diligence. And yet the losses the Cooperative bankers didn’t see are so large the Coop bank has found its debt downgraded to junk.

I suggest, if you are willing to consider that the Co-operative bank and its bankers are a little more honest than most, that this indicates that it is the system itself, the origination of loans, how they are structured, how securitization works, how bankers are trained, how complex the financial products and deals are, that is the problem. Beyond even corruption, of which there is no shortage, the system itself is crap. It is not fit for any positive social purpose. It enriches the few while systematically endangering and then impoverishing the many. It concentrates power in a few hands who then insist that democratic power should be taken out of the hands of the many and given instead to technocrats drawn from the ranks of the few.

In conclusion.

Our financial system would have collapsed simply because IT DOESN’T WORK, not as an open and equitable system. Sure it makes profits… for some.  But so does riding around in a Mongol Hoard sacking cities. The present financial system is NOT a fair and open system where by dint of hard work, insight, research and expertese anyone can have a reasonable chance of prospering. It has not and will not NOT work as a repository for hard earned savings and pensions. Both are being systemaitcally pillaged for the ‘good’ of the major banks.

Whether one believes the capitalist system is a good thing or not, or even a potentially good thing, what we can perhaps all agree on is that it – our financial system – is NOT at the moment good for the many, and will not be in the future, if left in the hands of the repulsive elite who presently run it, defend it, facilitate it and profit by it.

via What bankers don’t know » Golem XIV – Thoughts.

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Wonders in the Dark

Cinema, music, opera, books, television, theater

Just Reviews

Just another WordPress.com site

Mark David Welsh

Feeding Soda Pop to the Thirsty Pigs since 2013

conradbrunstrom

Things I never thunk before.

News from the San Diego Becks

The life and times of Erik, Veronica and Thomas

The Silent Film Quarterly

The Only Magazine Dedicated To Silent Cinema

Leaden Circles

First a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air.

My Archives

because the internet is not forever

CineSocialUK

Up to the minute, fair, balanced, informed film reviews.

PUZZLED PAGAN PRESENTS

A Shrine to Pop Culture Obsessiveness. With Lots of Spoilers

Thrilling Days of Yesteryear

“Nostalgia isn’t what it used to be” – Peter DeVries

thedullwoodexperiment

Viewing movies in a different light

Twenty Four Frames

Notes on Film by John Greco

Suzanne's Mom's Blog

Arts, Nature, Good Works, Luna & Stella Lockets & Birthstones

It Doesn't Have To Be Right...

... it just has to sound plausible

NJ Corporate Portrait Photographer Blog

The life of a corporate portrait photographer who likes to shoot just about anything.

arwenaragornstar

A French girl's musings...

Jordan and Eddie (The Movie Guys)

Australian movie blog - like Margaret and David, just a little younger

Octopus Films

A place for new perspectives on films, TV, media and entertainment.

scifist 2.0

A sci-fi movie history in reviews

The Reviewer's Corner

The Sometimes Serious Corner of the Internet for Anime, Manga, and Comic related things

First Impressions

Notes on Films and Culture

1,001 Movies Reviewed Before You Die

Where I Review One of the 1,001 Movies You Should Watch Before you Die Every Day

Movies Galore of Milwaukee

Movie Galore takes a look at Silent films on up to current in development projects and gives their own opinion on what really does happen in film!

The Catwing Has Landed

A Writer's Blog About Life and Random Things

Gabriel Diego Valdez

Movies and how they change you.

The Horror Incorporated Project

Lurking among the corpses are the body snatchers....plotting their next venture into the graveyard....the blood in your veins will run cold, your spine tingle, as you look into the terror of death in tonight's feature....come along with me into the chamber of horrors, for an excursion through.... Horror Incorporated!

Relatos desde mi ventana

Sentimientos, emociones y reflexiones

Teri again

Finding Me; A site about my life before and after a divorce

unveiled rhythms

Life In Verses

Gareth Roberts

Unorthodox Marketing & Strategy

leeg schrift

Taalarmen

100 Films in a Year

12 months. 100 films. Hopefully.

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